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Purpose of this paper (limit 100 
words) 
Over the last decade, trust repair has become an 
important theoretical and practical concern in 
HRM. In this paper we attempt to explain why  
organizations fail to repair their stakeholders’ trust 
following a series of trust breaches.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
(limit 100 words) 
We analyze the archival data to investigate the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) – one of the largest 
failures in UK corporate history. We adopt a 
process theory approach and the analytical frame 
of a detective novel to investigate reputational 
scandals in RBS. In doing so we explore the 
interweaving of two stories: the story of the 
‘crime’ (the bank’s actions which led to breaches 
of trust) and the story of the ‘detectives’ 
(parliamentary, regulatory and press investigators). 
 
Findings (limit 100 words) We find that the organization’s failure to repair 
trust is associated with ineffective detection of 
what went wrong in the bank and why.  
 
Research implications (limit 100 
words) 
Our paper concludes by suggesting that analysing 
these two stories might give us a more nuanced 
understanding of the vicious circle of 
organizational transgressions 
Implications for Practice (100 
words) 
Our analysis of the RBS case also points to certain 
weaknesses in current trust repair scholarship. 
Many scholars focus on one organizational 
transgression as a unit of analysis, and apply stage 
models of trust repair to understand the process of 
organizational recovery. We advocate an 
appreciation of the complicated and unfolding 
nature of repeated transgressions, which, we 
argue, is addressed by approaching trust repair 
from a process perspective. 
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Social implications (if applicable) An	   organization	   may	   be	   admitting	   the	  destructive	   impact	   of	   the	   event	   on	   trust,	   and	  beginning	   to	   show	   willingness	   to	   accept	  responsibility	  for	  the	  violation,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  new	   transgression	  may	  happen,	   further	  damaging	  trust	  and	  derailing	  trust	  repair	  efforts.	  	  Therefore,	   what	   is	   needed	   in	   organizations	   is	  longitudinal	   analysis	   that	   takes	   into	   account	  organizational	   history,	   including	   the	   history	   of	  earlier	  wrongdoings.	  	  
 
What is originality/value of paper 
(limit 100 words) 
We	   conclude	   by	   suggesting	   that	   analysing	   the	  story	   of	   transgression	   and	   the	   story	   of	  investigation	   in	   organizations	   might	   give	   us	   a	  more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   the	   vicious	  circle	   of	   organizational	   transgressions	   and	  practical	  measures	  for	  dealing	  with	  them.	  
 
	  
Keywords:	  banking,	  detective	   story,	   organizational	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   process	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  trust	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  repair.	  	  
Introduction	  
	  Following	  recent	  corporate	  governance	  failures	  connected	  with	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (GFC),	   organizational	   attempts	   to	   repair	   trust	   have	   become	   an	   important	   topic	   for	  researchers	   concerned	   with	   organizational	   effectiveness	   (Bourne	   and	   Edwards	   2010;	  Gillespie	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Bachmann,	  Gillespie,	  and	  Priem	  2015).	   	  There	  is	  a	  proliferation	  of	  studies	   into	   trust	   repair	   where	   an	   organization,	   an	   institution	   or	   the	   whole	   industry	  breached	  trust	  and	  was	  held	  responsible	  for	  failure	  (Dietz	  and	  Gillespie	  2011;	  Gillespie,	  Hurley,	  Dietz,	   and	  Bachmann	  2012;	   Gillespie,	  Dietz,	   and	   Lockey	   2014).	  Organizational	  trust	   repair	   has	   some	   similarities	   with	   interpersonal	   trust	   repair,	   but	   there	   are	   also	  differences	  that	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  translate	  research	  findings	  across	  levels	  (Gillespie	  and	  Dietz	   2009;	   Fulmer	   and	   Gelfand	   2012).	   In	   contrast	   to	   interpersonal	   trust	   repair,	  organizational	   trust	   repair	   is	   much	   more	   complex	   because	   a	   range	   of	   organizational	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actors	  operating	  at	  different	  levels	  can	  influence	  and	  inform	  the	  judgements	  of	  potential	  trustors	  (Gillespie	  and	  Siebert	  2018).	  	  Most	   studies	  of	   trust	   repair	   take	  a	  variance	   theory	  perspective	   (Mohr	  1982)	   involving	  identification	  of	  the	  antecedents	  and	  outcomes	  of	  such	  trust	  repair	  efforts	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kramer	  and	  Lewicki	  2010).	  	  Critics	  of	  this	  approach	  called	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  process	  perspective	  (inspired	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Langley	  1999;	  Langley	  and	  Tsoukas	  2016;	  Pettigrew,	  1987),	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  context	  of	  trust	  repair	  and	  its	  temporal	  dimensions	  (Gillespie	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Möllering	  2012).	  	  So,	  rather	  than	  looking	  at	  
what	  works	  in	  trust	  repair,	  which	  is	  the	  province	  of	  variance	  theory,	  we	  focus	  here	  on	  the	  how	  question	  (Pettigrew,	  2012):	  how	  trust	  repair	  works	  or	  fails	  to	  work	  by	  showing	  how	  how	  organizational	   trust	   is	  mutually	  constituted	  by	  key	  actors	  over	   time.	   	   	  Within	  this	  processual	  approach	  we	  use	  the	  frame	  of	  a	  detective	  novel	  as	  our	  analytical	  lens,	  which	  helps	  illustrate	  this	  dynamic	  process	  of	  mutual	  constitution	  by	  interweaving	  two	  stories	  –	  those	  of	  the	  	  ‘criminals’	  and	  of	  the	  ‘detectives’	  	  It	  has	  often	  been	  pointed	  out	   that	  social	   science	   in	  general	  and	  organization	   theory	   in	  particular	  	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  literary	  genre	  because	  they	  rely	  on	  storytelling	  (Nicolson	  1946;	  Porter	  1981;	  Hühn	  1987;	  Czarniawska	  1999;	  Rhodes	  2001;	  Boje	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Gabriel	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Saylors	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Boje	  et	  al.	  2016).	  Thus	  we	  felt	  justified	  in	  choosing	  the	  detective	  story	  as	  an	  analogy	  because	  this	  form	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  being	  similar	  to	  academic	  research	  in	  the	  way	  activities	  are	  portrayed	  (Czarniawska	  1999;	  Mintzberg,	  2005).	  Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  unfolding	  stories	  centred	  on	  detectives,	  such	  as	  the	  TV	  series	  ‘The	  Wire’,	  provide	  a	  much	  richer	  form	  of	  analysis	  of	  social	  phenomena	  than	  the	  traditional	  methods	  of	  social	  sciences	  (Holt	  and	  Zundel	  2014).	  Therefore,	  	  we	  argue	  that	  for	  the	  RBS	  story	  the	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analogy	  with	  detectives	  provides	  new	  insights	  into	  trust	  repair	  because	  the	  investigators	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  regulators,	  media,	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  and	  academic	  researchers)	  did	  as	  much	  to	  socially	  construct	  the	  story	  of	   trust	  breach	  and	  repair	  as	  those	  directly	  implicated	  with	  the	  transgressions.	  	  	  	  We	   explore	   in	   more	   detail	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   organization	   and	   people	   that	  breached	   trust	   and	   the	   agents	   who	   investigated	   the	   breaches,	   since	   the	   two	   are	  dynamically	  interlinked	  in	  providing	  important	  contexts	  for	  each	  others’	  actions.	  	  	  One	  of	  our	  main	  propositions	  is	  that	  organizations’	  failure	  to	  learn	  and	  move	  on	  from	  	  repeated	  trust	  transgressions	  are	  as	  much	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  those	  who	  investigate	  breaches	  of	   trust	   as	   those	   committing	   breaches	   of	   trust	   because	   of	   their	   mutually	   constitutive	  relationship	  over	   time.	   	   	  We	   therefore	   ask	   the	  process	  question:	   	  How	  do	   trust	   repair	  efforts	  in	  organizations	  fail?	  By	  drawing	  on	  the	  detective	  story	  as	  a	  metaphor	  we	  address	  this	   question	   so	   	   that	   it	   might	   throw	   some	   light	   on	   the	   process	   of	   organizational	  reintegration	  following	  a	  reputational	  scandal.	  	  	  Our	  story	  begins	  with	  a	  series	  of	  unfolding	  events	  occurring	  in	  the	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  (RBS),	  which,	  taken	  together,	  led	  to	  a	  profound	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  one	  of	  the	  UK’s	  oldest	  and	  previously	  most	  reputable	  banks.	  The	  initial	  event	  is	  attributed	  with	  causing	  one	  of	  the	  largest	   failures	   in	   corporate	   history	   and	   resulted	   in	   RBS	   being	   bailed	   out	   by	   the	   UK	  taxpayer	   in	   2008.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   RBS	   has	   still	   not	   been	   returned	   to	   private	  ownership,	   despite	   the	   UK	   government’s	   promises	   to	   recoup	   taxpayers’	   ‘investment’	  (Fraser	  2014;	  Martin	  2013;	  Whittle	  and	  Mueller	  2012).	  This	  collapse,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  major	  trust	  breach,	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  new	  scandals	  that	  have	  severely	  hindered	  further	  trust	  repair	  efforts	  by	  the	  bank.	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  The	   repeated	   nature	   of	   these	   transgressions	   evokes	   the	   notion	   of	   organizational	  ‘recidivism’,	  a	  term	  we	  borrow	  from	  criminology	  literature.	  Recidivism	  is	  a	  fundamental	  concept	   in	  criminal	   justice	  (e.g.	  Zara	  and	  Farrington	  2015;	  Zamble	  and	  Quinsey	  2001),	  where	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  person’s	  habitual	  relapse	  into	  crime.	  Within	  criminology	  recidivism	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  following	  framework:	  (1)	  a	  starting	  event,	  such	  as	  release	  from	  prison,	  (2)	  a	  measure	   of	   failure,	   such	   as	   a	   subsequent	   arrest,	   and	   (3)	   a	   time	  period,	   a	   recidivism	  window,	  which	   runs	   from	   the	   date	   of	   the	   starting	   event	   (Zara	   and	   Farrington	   2014).	  Startling	  as	  it	  sounds,	  there	  is	  a	  similar	  term	  in	  medicine	  for	  a	  recurring	  illness,	  which	  is	  evidence	  of	  the	  words	  use	  prior	  to	  the	  modern	  penal	  system.	   	  Therefore,	  as	  recidivism	  implies	   the	   recurrence	   of	   an	   undesirable	   state,	   we	   use	   this	   term	   as	   a	   metaphor	   for	  recurrent	  breaches	  of	  trust.	  	  Our	  findings	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  study	  of	  trust	  breaches	  and	  trust	  repair.	  Firstly,	  our	  adoption	  of	  process	  theory,	  which	  focuses	  on	  how	  content	  and	  process	  issues	  unfold	  over	   time	   	   in	   multiple	   levels	   of	   changing	   contexts,	   (Pettigrew,	   2012),	   	   enabled	   us	   to	  provide	  a	  	  more	  nuanced	  and	  dynamic	  understanding	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  trust	  breach	  and	  trust	  repair	  since	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  studies	  	  focus	  on	  a	  one-­‐‑off	  breach	  of	  trust	  and	  subsequent	   trust	   repair	  efforts.	   In	  cases	  such	  as	   the	  one	  we	  studied	  –	  RBS,	  which	  was	  found	  guilty	  of	  multiple	  transgressions	  –	  focusing	  on	  one	  transgression	  is	  inadequate.	  A	  more	   longitudinal	   perspective	   on	   the	   past	   failures	   allows	   us	   to	   appreciate	   a	   broader	  pattern	   of	   failure,	   which	   may	   be	   caused	   by	   systemic	   issues.	   Secondly,	   the	   use	   of	   the	  detective	  story	  as	  a	  	  metaphor	  allows	  us	  to	  separate	  the	  story	  of	  the	  crime	  from	  the	  story	  of	  the	  detectives’	  investigations,	  and	  by	  considering	  these	  two	  parallel	  stories	  we	  attempt	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to	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  organizations	  to	  learn	  and	  move	  on	  when	  crimes	  are	  not	  investigated	  properly.	  	  We	  start	  by	  outlining	  the	  two	  approaches	  to	  trust	  repair	  based	  on	  variance	  theory	  and	  process	  theory.	  Locating	  our	  analysis	  in	  the	  latter	  approach,	  we	  explain	  our	  methodology	  and	  proceed	  to	   the	  analysis	  of	  our	  case	  study.	  We	  conclude	  with	   the	  discussion	  of	  our	  contributions	  and	  implications	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
Variance	  and	  process	  theories	  of	  trust	  repair	  Research	  on	  trust	  breaches	  and	  trust	  repair	  spans	  various	  disciplines	  where	  theory	  and	  research	  explore	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  trust	  is	  violated,	  	  the	  strategies	  leading	  to	  trust	   repair	   and	   their	   theoretical	   underpinnings,	   and	   the	   benefits	   of	   being	   trusted	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kramer	  and	  Lewicki	  2010).	  However,	  while	  on	  the	   surface	   research	   on	   trust	   suggests	   a	   plurality	   of	   approaches	   and	   a	   degree	   of	  heterogeneity,	   its	   underpinning	   assumptions	   are	   relatively	   narrow.	   We	   find	   that	   the	  majority	  of	  trust	  repair	  literature	  is	  underpinned	  by	  what	  Mohr	  (1982)	  called	  a	  variance	  theory	  approach	  to	  research.	  Exemplars	  of	  this	  approach	  include	  work	  by	  Bottom,	  Gibson,	  Daniels	  and	  Murnighan	  (2002);	  Desmet,	  De	  Cremer	  and	  van	  Dijk	  (2011);	  Ferrin,	  Bligh,	  and	  Kohles	  (2007);	  Ferrin,	  Kim,	  Cooper	  and	  Dirks	  (2007);	  Kim,	  Ferrin,	  Cooper	  and	  Dirks	  (2004);	  Kim,	  Dirks,	  Cooper	  and	  Ferrin	  (2006);	  and	  Xie	  and	  Peng	  (2009).	  Such	  an	  approach	  involves	  searching	  for	  both	  antecedents	  and	  outcomes	  of	  trust	  repair	  strategies	  as	  well	  as	  explanations	   of	   causal	   relationships	   between	   dependent	   and	   independent	   variables.	  Typically,	   the	   searching	   is	   done	   in	   a	   unidirectional	  way,	  where	   organizational	   actions	  taken	  by	  the	  ‘trustee’,	  senior	  managers,	  are	  claimed	  to	  lead	  to	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  ‘trustor’	  perceptions.	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  The	   focus	   of	   these	   studies	   is	   on	   evaluations	   of	   trust	   repair	   interventions	   and	   on	  delineating	  those	  independent	  variables	  (i.e.	  trust	  repair	  responses)	  that	  shape	  recovery.	  	  	  In	  organizational	  change	  theory,	  these	  are	  usually	  described	  as	  content	  issues	  (Pettigrew,	  and	  Whipp,	   1991).	   	   The	   independent	   variables	  most	   commonly	   used	   in	   this	   research	  approach	   are	   apology,	   denial,	   reticence,	   excuse,	   promise,	   financial	   compensation	   and	  justification,	  on	  which	  there	  is	  extensive	  literature	  (see	  Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kramer	  and	  Lewicki	  2010	  for	  review).	  	  	  In	  trust	  repair	  studies,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  symbolic	  and	  substantive	  variables	  has	  been	  tested	   with	   different	   types	   of	   transgressions.	   A	   mechanical	   metaphor	   dominates	   this	  approach,	  which	  implies	  that	  with	  certain	  ‘tools’	  and	  interventions	  a	  broken	  relationship	  can	  be	  restored	  to	  its	  original	  state.	  	  While	  these	  studies	  are	  highly	  valuable,	  they	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  unfolding	  and	  dynamic	  nature	  of	  transgressions	  in	  organizations	  following	  previous	   failures	   to	   recover	   fully	   from	   crises	   of	   trust.	   This	   is	   problematic	   because	  repeated	  trust	  transgressions	  and	  failures	  are	  common	  in	  organizations.	  	  Thus	  we	  argue,	  this	  phenomenon	  	  can	  best	  be	  addressed	  by	  adopting	  a	  process	  perspective	  to	  the	  study	  	  (Langley	  1999;	  Pettigrew,	  2012).	  	  	  Process	  theory	  in	  organizational	  studies	  has	  been	  traditionally	  classified	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  ‘weak’	   or	   ‘strong’	   (Hernes	   2014).	   	   A	   weak	   process	   theory	   is	   understood	   to	   be	   an	  explanation	  whereby	   stable	   entities	   (such	   as	   organizations	   and	   principal	   actors)	   exist	  prior	  to	  processes	  (such	  as	  actions	  that	  breach	  and	  repair	  trust)	  and	  remain	  relatively	  stable	  during	  a	  process	  of	  change.	  	  Strong	  process	  theories	  do	  not	  propose	  a	  world	  of	  pre-­‐‑existing	  entities	  or	  variables	  that	  are	  abstracted	  from	  processes	  and	  taken	  to	  be	  real	  or	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concrete;	  instead	  they	  start	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  flows	  of	  events	  and	  processes	  create	  entities	  whose	  very	  existence	   is	  dependent	  on	   them	  being	  part	  of	  a	  process	  of	   change	  (Chia	  and	  Langley,	  2004).	  	  	  	  The	  metaphor	  used	  by	  Chia	  and	  Langley	  here	  is	  of	  actors	  not	  being	  able	  to	  stand	  in	  the	  same	  river	  twice,	  because	  it	   is	  never	  the	  same	  river	  and	  it	  is	  never	  the	  same	  actor.	  	  In	  essence,	  actors,	  actions	  and	  events	  mutally	  constitute	  each	  other	  over	  time.	  	  There	  are	  only	  a	  few	  examples	  of	  process	  theorisation	  in	  trust	  repair,	  all	  of	  which	  could	  be	  classed	  as	  weak	  process	  theories.	  Some	  of	  these	  focused	  on	  mapping	  the	  sequence	  of	  trust	  repair	  stages	  associated	  with	  the	  re-­‐‑integration	  of	  previously	  corrupt	  organizations	  and	  restoring	  credibility	  with	  stakeholders	  following	  a	  crisis	  	  (Lewicki	  and	  Bunker	  1996;	  Pfarrer	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Gillespie	  and	  Dietz	  2009).	   In	  contrast	   to	  the	   ‘stage	  models’	  of	   trust	  repair,	  we	  adopt	  a	  strong	  process	  theory	  approach	  and	  draw	  on	  narrative	  analysis	  using	  the	  detective	  story	  analogy	  as	  our	  analytical	  lens.	  	  We	  perceive	  organizational	  recidivism,	  an	  important	  organizational	  outcomes,	  as	  a	  process	  that	  creates	  and	  is	  created	  by	  	  two	  sets	   of	   actors	   –	   criminals	   who	   repeatedly	   engage	   in	   organizational	   wrongdoing	   and	  detectives	  who	  fail	  to	  identify	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  mistakes.	  	  	  Thus	  the	  criminals’	  failure	  to	  learn	  from	  repeated	  mistakes	  is	  compounded	  by	  a	  process	  in	  which	  the	  detectives	  fail	  to	  properly	  uncover	  	  the	  offences.	  	   	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  wider	  political	  and	  social	  context	  in	  which	  events	  unfold,	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  actors	  provide	  important	  inner	  contexts	  (Pettigrew	  and	  Whipp,	   1991)	   for	   each	   others’	   sensemaking	   and	   actions,	   and	   in	   so	  doing,	  mutally	  constitute	  each	  other	  over	  time.	   	  By	  inner	  contexts	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  culture,	  politics	  and	  	  ways	  of	  working	   in	  organizational	   fields,	   such	  as	  banking	  and	   financial	   services.	   	  This	  relational	  dynamic	  	  of	  trust	  breach	  and	  trust	  repair	  is	  a	  key	  lesson	  for	  HR	  scholars	  and	  practioners.	  	  A	  close	  parallel	  to	  this	  process	  theory	  of	  trust	  repair	  	  can	  be	  found	  in	  	  the	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recent	  change	  in	  focus	  in	  understanding	  the	  process	  of	  leadership,	  which	  has	  moved	  to	  a	  concern	  with	  identifying	  	  leaders’	  traits	  and	  behaviours	  to	  research	  into	  how	  leaders	  and	  followers	  mutually	  constitute	  each	  other	   in	   internal	  and	  external	   contexts	   that	  change	  over	  time	  (De	  Rue	  and	  Ashford,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Methodology	  To	  answer	  our	  research	  question,	  we	  analysed	  a	  case	  of	  trust	  breakdown	  in	  RBS.	  This	  case	  was	  well	  documented	  in	  the	  media	  and	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  most	  spectacular	  and	  high	  profile	  corporate	  failures	  in	  UK	  economic	  history.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  regarded	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  as	  probably	  the	  most	  significant	  breach	  of	  organizational	  trust	  in	  the	  UK	  in	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   In	   addition,	   our	   knowledge	   of	   other	   recent	   events	   in	   the	  UK	  banking	  sector	  led	  to	  our	  conclusion	  that	  banks	  often	  repeatedly	  commit	  transgressions	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  breach	  of	  trust,	  a	  startling	  phenomenon,	  which	  we	  sought	  to	  explain.	  	  	  We	  collected	  archival	  data	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  documentary	  sources:	  official	  reports	  by	  the	  UK	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (FSA),	  UK	  Parliamentary	  reports,	  RBS	  internal	  reports	  and	  evaluations	  available	  publicly,	  academic	  and	  practitioner	  evaluations	  of	  RBS	  and	  its	  collapse,	   press	   commentaries,	   TV	   broadcasts,	   broadcast	   interviews	   with	   RBS	  management,	  and	  TV	  documentaries.	  The	  use	  of	  such	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  sources	  enabled	  us	  to	  gain	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  trust	  issues	  at	  RBS.	  We	  also	  took	  into	  consideration	  the	  authorship	   of	   documentary	   sources	   and	   their	   purpose,	   and	   acknowledged	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  documents	  and	  their	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  context	  (McCulloch	  2004).	  Notably,	  the	  accounts	  of	  RBS	  failure	  and	  attempts	  at	  recovery	  were	  constructed	  during	  the	  climate	  of	  the	  GFC,	  a	  period	  when	  the	  press	  attributed	  much	  of	  the	  success	  and	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failure	  of	  organizations	  to	  heroic	  or	  villainous	  leaders.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  environment	  undoubtedly	  affected	  how	  events	  at	  RBS	  were	  reported	  in	  the	  media.	  	  
The	  analysis	  The	   detective	   novel	   has	   a	   number	   of	   charactersitics	   that	   made	   it	   a	   good	   analytical	  framework	   for	  our	   study	  of	  RBS	  and	   their	   repeated	   transgressions	   (Mintzberg,	  2005).	  Firstly,	  a	  distinctive	  characteristic	  of	  the	  detective	  novel	  is	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  social	  context	  within	  which	  detectives,	  like	  researchers,	  work	  to	  solve	  crimes.	  This	  feature	  mirrors	  the	  importance	   of	   the	   economic	   and	   social	   context	   within	   which	   RBS	   operated	   and	  encountered	  problems.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  detective	  who	  solves	  the	  problem	  and	  aims	  ‘to	  reveal	  true	  meaning,	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  rule	  of	  reason	  and	  to	  re-­‐‑impose	  order	  over	  chaos’	  (Czarniawska,	  1999).	  The	  detectives	   in	  the	  RBS	  story	  operated	  at	  a	  number	  of	   levels	  –	  regulators	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  European	  Commission;	  UK	  Parliamentary	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  Standards;	  Financial	  Services	  Authority	  (FSA);	  UK	  Treasury;	  UK	  Fraud	  Squad;	  courts;	   and,	   indeed,	   internal	   bank	   investigators	   such	   as	   risk	   management,	   audit	   and	  senior	  management	   committees	  established	   to	   identify	   ‘root	   causes’	  of	   transgressions.	  Also,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  academic	  researchers	  tried	  to	  understand	  what	  went	  wrong	  with	  RBS	  and	  who	  was	  to	  blame.	  Thirdly,	  the	  plot	  of	  a	  detective	  novel	  typically	  consists	  of	  two	  stories	  –	  the	  story	  of	  the	  criminals	  and	  their	  actions	  and	  the	  story	  of	  the	  investigation.	  	  Usually,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  second	  story	  that	  the	  first	  story	  is	  revealed	  (Holt	  and	  Zundel	  2014).	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  RBS	  we	  were	  analysing	  the	  motives	  and	  values,	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  of	  the	  regulatory	  body,	  parliamentarians,	  financial	  journalists,	  internal	  investigators	  and	  researchers	  who	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  detectives.	  As	  such,	  the	  outcome	  was	  a	  range	  of	  stories	  that	  fitted	  into	  two	  categories:	  stories	  from	  the	  'suspects',	   i.e.	   those	   produced	   by	   senior	   managers	   trying	   to	   ‘cover	   their	   tracks’;	   and	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stories	  from	  the	  investigators	  who	  published	  reports.	  In	  addition,	  we	  focused	  on	  events,	  actions,	  happenings	  and	  other	  data	  concerning	  trust	  breaches	  at	  RBS,	  and,	  as	  our	  analysis	  progressed,	   we	   started	   to	   develop	   a	   timeline	   of	   events	   that	   provided	   a	   coherent	   and	  temporally	  organised	  account	  of	  the	  trust	  breaches.	  	  	  	  
The	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland	  –	  the	  story	  unfolds	  Like	   good	   literature,	   the	   tragic	   narrative	   of	   this	   case	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   unfolding	  episodes,	  so	  our	  analysis	  is	  structured	  in	  episodes,	  each	  consisting	  of	  a	  description	  of	  the	  transgression,	  the	  investigation,	  and	  trust	  repair	  strategies.	  	  
	  
Prologue	  
The	  spectacular	  growth.	  RBS	  was	  founded	  in	  1727	  in	  Edinburgh	  and,	  as	  a	  bank	  firmly	  rooted	   in	   the	   Scottish	   economy,	   remained	   a	   small	   bank	   serving	   the	   needs	   of	   local	  businesses	  (Kerr	  and	  Robinson	  2011).	  However,	  deregulation	  of	  financial	  services	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  the	  mid-­‐‑1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  made	  RBS	  attractive	  for	  acquisition	  by	  other	  banks	  (Fraser	  2014;	  Martin	  2013).	  To	  avoid	  this	  RBS	  embarked	  on	  a	  strategy	  of	  growth-­‐‑through-­‐‑acquisition	   by	   hiring	  more	   entrepreneurial	  managers	  who	  were	  willing	   to	   pursue	   the	  bank’s	  expansion	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  overseas.	  This	  strategy	  was	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  CEO	  Fred	  Goodwin	  (Groysberg	  and	  Sherman	  2008).	  	  	  
	  
Episode	  1:	  One	  acquisition	  too	  many	  
Trust	  breach.	  Having	  developed	  an	  earlier	  presence	  in	  the	  highly	  profitable	  investment	  banking	  sector	  through	  the	  purchase	  of	  Greenwich	  Capital	  Markets	  in	  the	  USA,	  RBS	  sought	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to	  expand	  in	  that	  market	  by	  signalling	  its	  intention,	  in	  2007,	  to	  acquire	  a	  Dutch	  bank,	  ABN	  AMRO	  Holdings,	  which	  also	  had	  significant	  interests	  in	  investment	  banking.	  	  Despite	  ABN	  AMRO	  selling	   its	   investment	  bank	   to	  a	   rival	  bidder	   to	  ward	  off	  what	   it	   regarded	  as	  an	  unwelcome	   hostile	   acquisition,	   RBS	   continued	   with	   its	   consortium	   bid,	   even	   though	  financial	   analysts’	   expressed	   serious	   misgivings	   about	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   largest	   ever	  purchase	  in	  the	  financial	  services	  history.	  	  Consequently,	  RBS	  became	  a	  global	  bank	  –	  the	  world’s	   fifth	   largest	   bank	   by	   market	   capitalization	   and	   the	   largest	   corporate	   and	  institutional	  bank	  in	  Europe	  (Groysberg	  and	  Sherman	  2008).	  Unfortunately,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  many	  analysts,	  this	  acquisition	  proved	  to	  be	   ‘an	  extremely	  risky	  deal’,	  with	  RBS	  becoming	   over-­‐‑extended	   and	   undercapitalised.	   	   Both	   the	   financial	   press	   and	   the	   FSA	  subsequently	  criticised	  RBS	  for	  not	  ‘exercising	  due	  diligence’	  during	  its	  acquisition	  of	  ABN	  AMRO	  (FSA	  2011,	  25),	  which	  was	  pushed	  through	  by	  Goodwin	  and	  some	  of	  his	  board,	  despite	   previous	   assurances	   that	   RBS	   would	   not	   pursue	   growth	   through	   further	  acquisitions.	   	   	   Goodwin’s	   actions	   during	   this	   period,	   in	   particular,	   were	   said	   to	   have	  eroded	  investors’	  trust	  and	  caused	  unwillingness	  among	  other	  banks	  to	  lend	  to	  RBS	  when	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  the	  bank	  did	  not	  have	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  service	  its	  business.	  	  	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time	   in	  2007	  a	  major	   credit	   crunch	  began	   in	   the	  USA	  and	   rapidly	   spread	  overseas.	  This	  was	  the	  	  result	  of	  financial	  institutions	  being	  heavily	  exposed	  to	  high-­‐‑risk	  mortgage-­‐‑backed	  securities.	  Consequently,	  RBS,	  because	  of	  its	  heavy	  exposure	  to	  these	  ‘toxic	   assets’	   held	   by	   RBS	   Greenwich	   Capital	   in	   the	   USA,	   was	   further	   weakened	   and	  reported	  unprecedented	  losses	  during	  2008.	  In	  response	  RBS	  undertook	  a	  £12bn	  rights	  issue,	  a	  move	  that	  subsequently	   led	  to	   legal	  action	  against	  RBS	  and	  the	  fund	  managers	  who	   advised	   clients	   to	   take	   up	   the	   shares	   (Fraser	   2014),	   and	   became	   a	   source	   of	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humiliation	  for	  Goodwin	  and	  his	  board	  (Fraser	  2014;	  Martin	  2013).	  When	  the	  rights	  issue	  failed	  in	  2008,	  RBS	  went	  into	  decline	  and	  very	  quickly	  reached	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse.	  	  The	  UK	  government	  was	  forced	  to	  step	  in	  and	  compel	  Goodwin	  and	  his	  board,	   initially	  against	  their	  will,	  to	  accept	  cash	  to	  recapitalise	  the	  bank	  and	  provide	  it	  with	  the	  necessary	  liquidity	  to	  prevent	  a	  major	  systemic	  UK	  banking	  failure	  and	  national	  economic	  disaster.	  Thus	  the	  bank	  rapidly	  became	  state-­‐‑owned,	  with	  the	  taxpayer	  eventually	  owning	  83%	  of	  its	  equity.	  During	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  bailout	  and	  in	  the	  months	  following,	  RBS	  recorded	  losses	  of	  £24bn,	  which	  led	  to	  significant	  job	  reductions	  and	  a	  massive	  drop	  in	  employee	   engagement.	   Moreover,	   many	   employees	   felt	   that	   it	   was	   the	   senior	  management	  who	  let	  them	  down	  (CIPD	  2009;	  Fraser,	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  Investigation.	  The	  ABN	  AMRO	  deal	  was	  not	  the	  only	  reason	  for	  RBS’s	  failure.	  	  Indeed	  the	  FSA	  listed	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  significant	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  bank’s	  capital	  position,	  over-­‐‑reliance	  on	  risky	  wholesale	  funding,	  and	  substantial	  losses	  in	  credit	  trading	  activities	   (FSA	  2011).	   Significantly,	   the	  FSA	  also	   singled	  out	   the	  bank’s	   leadership	  and	  governance,	  poor	  decisions	  by	  the	  board,	  and	  an	  organizational	  culture	  that	  encouraged	  excessive	   risk-­‐‑taking	   as	   key	   elements	   in	   the	   failure	   of	   RBS.	   The	   problems	   with	   the	  organizational	  culture	  were	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  board’s	  inability	  to	  challenge	  the	  CEO’s	  management	   style	   and	   reticence	   regarding	   information	   on	   potential	   risks	   (FSA	  2011;	  Martin	  &	  Gollan,	  2012).	  	  	  	  External	  governance	  had	  a	   role	   to	  play	   in	  hindering	  RBS’s	   trust	   repair	  efforts.	   In	   fact,	  evidence	  of	  	  the	  FSA’s	  inadequate	  regulatory	  framework	  and	  supervisory	  approach	  can	  be	   seen	   in	   their	   report	   on	   RBS,	   published	   in	   2011.	   Even	   before	   the	   collapse	   the	   FSA	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recognised	   deficiencies	   in	   the	   approach	   to	   monitoring	   the	   bank’s	   liquidity	   and	   an	  inadequate	  analysis	  of	  trading	  book	  inventory	  (Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  2012),	  which	  suggested	   underlying	   competency	   issues	   (Mayer	   et	   al.	   1995).	   	   Yet,	   the	   FSA’s	   actions	  resulting	  from	  its	  own	  detection	  of	  these	  deficiencies	  were	  slow,	  and	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  collapse.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  FSA	  promised	  to	  learn	  from	  these	  mistakes	  by	  creating	  the	  new	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  –	   an	  approach	   to	   trust	   repair	   involving	   the	  use	  of	   a	   third	  party	  and	  potential	  trust	  transference	  onto	  RBS	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015).	  However,	  this	  did	  not	  inspire	  the	  wider	  public’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  The	  FSA’s	  admission	  of	   its	   own	   failures	   and	   deficiencies	   in	   its	   regulation	   and	   supervision	   of	   RBS	   further	  damaged	  trust	  repair	  efforts.	   	   	  Another	  such	  example	  of	   failed	  detection	  and	   failure	   to	  learn	   was	   the	   so-­‐‑called	   Turner	   Review	   (FSA	   2009),	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   number	   of	  remedial	   reforms,	   such	   as	   an	   increased	   investment	   in	   the	   supervision	   of	   high-­‐‑impact	  firms,	  deployment	  of	  specialist	  resources,	  far	  more	  detailed	  firm	  reporting,	  greater	  focus	  on	  asset	  quality	  issues,	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  a	  change	  in	  corporate	  governance.	  	  
	  
Trust	  repair.	  After	  the	  2008	  breakdown	  and	  investigations	  the	  UK	  government	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  substantive	  actions	  aimed	  at	  restoring	  trust	  in	  the	  banking	  sector.	  These	  not	  only	  included	  approaches	  such	  as	  regulation,	  control	  and	  transparency,	  but	  also	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  sense-­‐‑making	  exercise	  where	  shared	  understanding	  of	   the	   failure	  and	  why	   it	  happened	  is	  necessary	  for	  effective	  trust	  repair	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  	  	  The	   first	   step	   towards	   trust	   repair	   employed	   a	   strategy	   called	   ‘changing	  of	   the	   guard’	  (Gillespie,	  Dietz,	  and	  Lockey	  2014).	  This	  involved	  a	  change	  of	  leadership	  and	  governance	  structure,	  which	  included	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	  board.	  Also,	  senior	  political	  figures	  associated	  with	  the	  UK	  government’s	  bailout	  of	  the	  bank	  insisted	  on	  the	  resignation	  of	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Fred	  Goodwin	  and	  his	  senior	  management	  team,	  albeit	  on	  very	  generous	  pension	  terms,	  which	  subsequently	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  important	  constraint	  on	  the	  process	  of	  trust	  repair	  with	  the	  general	  public,	  media	  and	  politicians.	  	  	  	  The	  next	  step	  by	  senior	  politicians	  and	  the	  UK	  Treasury	  involved	  a	  structural	  or	  regulation	  and	   control	   approach	   to	   trust	   repair,	   which	   included	   formal	   rules	   and	   controls	   to	  constrain	  untrustworthy	  behaviour	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Moreover,	  they	   also	   engaged	   an	   additional	   trust	   repair	   approach	   known	   as	   the	   transparency	  approach	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015),	  which	   involved	  establishing	  a	  hands-­‐‑off	  governance	  structure	   by	   creating	   UK	   Financial	   Investments	   (UKFI)	   to	   manage	   the	   government’s	  interests	  in	  RBS.	  This	  also	  coincided	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  new	  CEO,	  Stephen	  Hester,	  and	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   RBS	   board.	   This	   executive	   group	  was	   then	   faced	  with	   two	  challenging	   tasks:	   firstly,	   to	   restore	   the	   bank’s	   financial	   performance	   while	   retaining	  talented	  people,	  and	  secondly,	  to	  repair	  public	  trust	  in	  the	  bank.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  post-­‐‑crisis	   public	   relations	   strategy	   that	   emphasised	   shareholders	   and	   a	   broader	   range	   of	  stakeholders,	  including	  customers,	  employees,	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  the	  customers	  and	   employees	   live	   and	  work,	   and	   ‘the	  wider	  world’	   (Investors	  RBS	  2012).	  Moreover,	  RBS’s	  strategy	  for	  sustainable	  banking	  claimed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  fair	  banking	  and	   	   supporting	   enterprise,	   employee	   engagement,	   security,	   citizenship	   and	   the	  environment	  (RBS	  internal	  strategy	  document).	  	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  bailout,	  Goodwin	  was	  forced	  to	  apologise	  to	  the	  shareholders,	  which	  he	  did	  reluctantly	  and	  belatedly:	  ‘I	  hope	  you	  get	  the	  sense	  today	  that	  I	  have	  a	  range	  of	  emotions	  about	  all	  of	  this.	  I	  am	  very	  disappointed	  and	  numbed	  by	  it’	  (BBC	  2011).	  When	  questioned	  by	   the	   	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  (February	  2009),	  Goodwin	  and	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other	   senior	   bankers	  were	   further	   compelled	   to	   apologise	   for	   their	   behaviour	   and	   to	  admit	  that	  the	  purchase	  of	  ABN	  AMRO	  was	  a	  mistake	  (BBC	  2011).	  These	  behaviours	  form	  part	  of	  the	  relational	  approach	  to	  trust	  repair	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015;	  Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Kramer	  and	  Lewicki	  2010).	  An	  approach	  based	  on	  assumptions	  that	  trust	  repair	  requires	  social	   rituals	  and	  symbolic	  acts	  not	  only	   to	  address	  negative	  emotions	  stemming	   from	  failures	  but	  also	  to	  re-­‐‑establish	  	  the	  relationship’s	  social	  order	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015).	  	  	  	  It	  is	  questionable	  whether	  structural	  remedies,	  in	  the	  form	  external	  regulation	  introduced	  after	   the	   GFC	   and	   the	   collapse	   of	   RBS,	   had	   the	   capacity	   to	   restore	   the	   trust	   of	   RBS	  employees	  and	   the	  public	   in	  general.	  Moreover,	   the	  self-­‐‑critical	   tone	  of	   the	  FSA	  report	  served	  to	  emphasise	  the	  deficiencies	  and	  ineffectiveness	  of	  external	  governance.	  	  
Episode	  2:	  Excessive	  payments	  to	  the	  bank	  executives	  
Trust	   breach.	   The	   period	   of	   substantive	   changes	   in	   RBS	   was	   followed	   by	   further	  controversy	  associated	  with	  the	  new	  board’s	  decision	  to	  continue	  high	  bonus	  payments	  to	  senior	  staff	  and	  maintain	  their	  exorbitant	  pensions.	  High	  payoffs	  and	  excessively	  high	  pension	  fund	  deficits	  divided	  the	  opinions	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  caused	  social	  disquiet.	  It	  was	  claimed	  that	  managers	  who	  benefited	  from	  excessive	  rewards	  attributed	  the	  bank’s	  success	  to	  these	  generous	  bonuses.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  dysfunctional	  consequences	  of	  such	  extraordinary	  payments	  tested	  the	  ‘tolerance	  of	  inequality’	  (Plender	  2012)	  and	  raised	   the	   question	   of	   distributional	   justice	   in	   corporate	   governance	   (Filatochev	   and	  Allcock	  2010;	  High	  Pay	  Commission	  2011).	  Moreover,	  senior	  RBS	  bankers	  conceded	  that	  the	   City's	   bonus	   culture	  may	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   crisis	   of	   2007–8,	   and	   Goodwin	  himself	   admitted	   that	   the	   bonus	   system	   was	   ‘something	   that	   should	   be	   looked	   at’;	  however,	  RBS	  did	  not	  accept	  that	  bonuses	  encouraged	  risk-­‐‑taking	  (Sparrow	  2009).	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  Thus,	  dissent	  amongst	  RBS	  stakeholders	  continued.	  For	  example,	  the	  £800m	  bonus	  pool	  for	   top	   staff	   led	   to	   shareholders’	   protests	   outside	   RBS	   headquarters,	   where	  demonstrators	   voiced	   their	   anger	   about	   the	   bonus	   culture	   in	   light	   of	   the	   chairman’s	  warnings	  that	  shareholders	  may	  never	  recoup	  their	  losses	  (The	  Scotsman	  May	  2012).	  	  In	  addition,	   the	   so-­‐‑called	   ‘Robin	   Hood	   Tax	   campaign’	   and	   other	   anti-­‐‑poverty	   protesters	  objected	  to	  these	  bonuses	  as	  they	  felt	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  was	  paying	  a	  very	  high	  price	  for	  the	  GFC.	  	  	  
The	  investigation.	  Although	  a	  well-­‐‑known	  monetarist,	  Patrick	  Minford	  (Minford,	  2010),	  argued	  that	  high	  payments	  for	  top	  bankers	  were	  essential	  to	  revive	  the	  sector	  and	  that	  the	   bonuses	   reflected	   the	   managers’	   contributions	   to	   rebuilding	   the	   bank,	   the	  Conservative	  government	  warned	  that	  it	  ‘would	  be	  following	  the	  bonus	  awards	  made	  by	  RBS	  particularly	   closely’	   given	   the	  huge	   losses	   to	   the	   taxpayer	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  2008	  bailout	  (The	  Scotsman,	  January	  2012).	  All	  of	  this	  led	  to	  ‘an	  atmosphere	  of	  outrage	  over	  excessive	  pay’	  (BBC	  2012),	  with	  more	  and	  more	  politicians	  from	  both	  the	  right	  and	  the	  left	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  joining	  in	  condemnation	  of	  the	  bonus	  culture.	  Despite	  this	  public	  outrage,	  the	  FSA,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  investigators	  in	  our	  story,	  believed	  there	  were	  insufficient	  grounds	  for	  enforcement	  cases	  against	  individuals	  or	  RBS	  because	  not	  enough	  evidence	  of	  culpability	  was	  available	  (FSA	  2011).	  	  
Trust	   repair.	   Following	   the	   controversy	   Hester	   decided	   to	   waive	   his	   2011	   bonus,	  alongside	  the	  chairman,	  Hampton,	  saying	  it	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  for	  him	  to	  accept	  a	  payout.	  Both	  decisions	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  part	  of	  trust	  repair	  mechanisms	  involving	  informal	   cultural	   controls	   to	   constrain	   untrustworthy	   behaviour	   and	   promote	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trustworthiness	   (Bachmann	   et	   al.	   2015).	   The	   Scotsman	   newspaper	   warned	   that	   ‘the	  debate	   about	   fair	   executive	   pay	   and	   responsible	   capitalism	   (was)	   only	   just	   beginning’	  (The	  Scotsman	  January	  2012).	  	  Amidst	  the	  controversy	  surrounding	  his	  pension,	  Goodwin	  decided	  to	  give	  up	  £200.000	  per	  year	  –	  leaving	  him	  with	  £342.500	  a	  year	  from	  the	  age	  of	  50.	  A	  view	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  press	  that	  the	  pension	  deal	  ‘drew	  a	  line	  under	  the	  problem	  of	  RBS	  and	  allowed	  the	  bank	  to	  focus	  on	  its	  recovery’	  (Inman	  and	  Tryhorn	  2009).	  	  The	   financial	   aspect	   of	   this	   particular	   punishment	   is	   another	   example	   of	   a	   relational	  approach	  to	  trust	  repair	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015),	  though	  the	  media	  suggested	  the	  deal	  was	  seen	  as	  a	   ‘reward	  for	  failure’	  (Field	  2012	  The	  Telegraph).	   	  The	  reduction	  in	  Goodwin’s	  pension	   coincided	   with	   a	   symbolic	   trust	   repair	   action	   –	   stripping	   Goodwin	   of	   his	  knighthood,	  which	  also	  triggered	  public	  discussion.	  Some	  commentators	  referred	  to	  this	  as	  Goodwin’s	   ‘evisceration’	   and	   ‘his	   final	   humiliation’	   (McKenna	  2012).	  Others	   argued	  that	   ‘deknighting	  Goodwin	  does	  nothing	   for	   the	  poor’,	   claiming	   it	  was	  merely	   ‘gesture	  economics’	   (Orr	  2012),	   it	   represented	   ‘papering	  over	   capitalism’s	  malfunctions’	   (Hyde	  2012),	  and	  there	  was	  ‘a	  whiff	  of	  the	  village	  green	  lynch	  mob	  about	  this’	  (BBC	  2012).	  Some	  saw	  it	  as	  scapegoating	  and	  ‘little	  more	  than	  a	  sideshow’	  (Field	  2012).	  Whereas,	  another	  commentator	  suggested	  that	  stripping	  Fred	  Goodwin	  of	  his	  knighthood	  was	  ‘a	  personal	  humiliation,	  perhaps,	  but	  nothing	  that	  his	  £16	  million	  pot,	  courtesy	  of	  the	  taxpayer,	  can’t	  ameliorate’	  (Anthony	  2012).	  	  	  
Episode	  3:	  Mis-­‐‑selling	  of	  payment	  protection	  insurance	  (PPI)	  policies	  
Trust	   breach.	   Despite	  many	   attempts	   by	   RBS	   and	   its	   owners	   –	   the	  UK	   taxpayer	   –	   to	  highlight	  positive	  changes,	  the	  road	  to	  recovery	  was	  hindered	  by	  a	  further	  trust	  violation	  when	  RBS	  again	  made	  the	  news	  during	  2010	  by	  becoming	  embroiled,	  along	  with	  all	  major	  UK	  banks,	  in	  the	  payment	  protection	  insurance	  (PPI)	  scandal.	  	  PPI	  policies	  were	  complex	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financial	  products	  sold	  to	  customers	  when	  they	  took	  on	  personal	  loans,	  credit	  cards	  or	  mortgages.	  These	  customers	  agreed	  to	  pay	  either	  a	  lump	  sum	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  loan	  or	  a	  premium	  each	  month,	  and	  	  the	  PPI	  policies	  were	  intended	  to	  cover	  borrowers’	  loan	  repayments	  if	  their	  income	  fell	  due	  to	  illness	  or	  loss	  of	  employment.	  	  These	  policies	  were	  recognised	  by	  the	  banks	  as	  highly	  profitable,	  which	  was	  why	  they	  were	  sold	  aggressively.	  But	  UK	  consumer	  associations	  and	  other	  critics	  of	  the	  financial	  services	  industry	  saw	  PPI	  policies	  as	  being	  of	  questionable	  value	  to	  customers.	  	  	  These	  critics	  pointed	  to	  four	  highly	  questionable	   features	   of	   many	   PPI	   policies	   (5/5/2011	   Guardian):	   	   first,	   they	   were	  expensive	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  benefits	  gained,	  sometimes	  adding	  between	  20%	  and	  50%	  to	  the	   cost	   of	   a	   loan;	   second,	   the	   benefits	   were	   severely	   circumscribed	   to	   specific	  circumstances	   of	   illness	   or	   job	   loss;	   third,	   they	   were	   often	   mis-­‐‑sold,	   either	   without	  borrowers	  knowing	   they	  had	  paid	   for	   them	  or	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  a	   loan;	  and	  fourth,	   claimants	   experienced	   significant	   problems	   and	   lengthy	   delays	   when	   making	  intricate	  claims.	  	  	  	  	  
The	   investigation.	   Criticism	  of	   PPIs	   prompted	   the	  UK	   financial	   regulator,	   the	   FSA,	   to	  investigate	  policy	  sales	  in	  2005,	  impose	  fines	  on	  insurance	  companies	  who	  mis-­‐‑sold	  PPIs	  from	  2006,	   and	  ban	   the	  most	  worthless	   type	  of	   insurance,	   the	   single	  premium	  PPI,	   in	  2009.	  	  Despite	  having	  ‘engaged’	  with	  the	  FSA	  in	  establishing	  remedial	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  PPIs	  were	  not	  mis-­‐‑sold	  to	  customers,	  RBS	  continued	  to	  mis-­‐‑sell	  PPIs	  (Parliamentary	  Commission	  on	  Banking	  Standards,	  Written	  Evidence	  from	  RBS	  2013).	  	  	  One	  response	  by	  RBS	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  PPI	  Executive	  Steering	  Group	  to	  oversee	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  problems	  generated	  by	  mis-­‐‑selling.	  Following	  internal	  investigations,	  this	  group	  recommended	  changes	  to	  the	  incentives	  given	  to	  branch	  sales	  staff,	  introducing	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better	   sales	   training,	   clawing-­‐‑back	   executive	   performance	   awards	   in	   respect	   of	   PPIs,	  withdrawing	  certain	  kinds	  of	  PPI	  products	  and	  improving	  handling	  of	  complaints	  against	  mis-­‐‑sold	  PPIs.	  	  	  	  	  
Trust	   repair.	   RBS	   took	   on	   board	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   PPI	   Executive	   Steering	  Group	  and	  focused	  on	  changes	  within	  its	  organizational	  culture	  	  (Bachmann	  et	  al	  2015).	  In	   its	   evidence	   to	   the	   Parliamentary	   Commission	   on	   Banking	   Standards	   in	   2013,	   RBS	  admitted	  that	  the	  company,	  along	  with	  the	  industry	  as	  a	  whole,	  was	  overly	  focused	  on	  growth,	  income	  and	  profits	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  capital,	  risk	  evaluation	  and	  liquidity.	  	  As	  a	  consequence	   the	   company	   culture	  was	   required	   to	   change	   to	   ‘put	   customers	   first	   and	  meet	   their	   expectations’.	   RBS	   also	  made	   a	   ‘Root	   Cause	   Analysis’	   of	   PPI	   complaints	   to	  ensure	  that	  its	  insurance	  products	  complied	  with	  regulatory	  guidelines.	  	  	  Despite	  taking	  these	  steps	  	  to	  restore	  trust,	  RBS	  (along	  with	  Barclays,	  Lloyds	  and	  HSBC)	  was	   associated	   with	   51%	   of	   the	   206,000	   complaints	   reviewed	   by	   the	   Financial	  Ombudsman	  Service	  in	  2010.	  The	  Ombudsman	  upheld	  71%	  of	  the	  complaints	  concerning	  RBS	  PPI	  sales,	  which	  resulted	  in	  £1.2bn	  of	  RBS	  funds	  being	  set	  aside	  for	  compensation	  to	  customers.	   	   	   Since	   2010,	   RBS	   has	   set	   aside	   an	   additional	   £1.9bn	   to	   cover	   further	  compensation	  claims.	  It	  therefore	  appears	  that	  the	  formal	  agencies	  of	  detection	  had	  much	  greater	  impact	  in	  this	  episode	  than	  on	  previous	  occasions,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  work	  of	  consumer	  associations.	  	   	  
Episode	  4:	  The	  LIBOR	  fixing	  scandal	  	  
Trust	   breach.	   Yet	   another	   scandal	   surfaced	   in	   2012,	   following	   an	   investigation	   by	  financial	  regulators	  in	  the	  USA,	  UK	  and	  European	  Union.	  In	  this	  episode	  RBS	  was	  found	  to	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have	   repeatedly	  manipulated	   the	  London	   Interbank	  Offered	  Rate	   (LIBOR)	   in	   collusion	  with	  fifteen	  other	  banks,	  which	  suggested	  integrity	  and	  benevolence	  issues	  (Mayer	  et	  al.	  1995).	   LIBOR	   is	   one	   of	   the	   world’s	   most	   important	   benchmark	   interest	   rates	   and	  influences	  the	  rates	  charged	  for	  unsecured	  funds	  loaned	  between	  banks.	  	  	  Many	  banks	  use	  LIBOR	  as	  a	  base	  rate	  for	  establishing	  commercial	  and	  personal	  loans	  as	  well	  as	  mortgages.	  	  It	   is	  also	  linked	  to	  government	  and	  corporate	  debt,	  and	  is	  used	  by	  financial	  analysts	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  market	  expectations.	  However,	  in	  this	  episode	  the	  regulators	  found	  that	  RBS	   traders,	  with	   the	   knowledge	   of	   their	  managers,	   routinely	   sought	   to	   influence	   the	  bank’s	   LIBOR	   submissions	   in	   order	   to	   profit	   from	   bets	   on	   derivatives	   –	   which	   is	   an	  integrity-­‐‑based	   trust	  violation	   (Mayer	  et	  al.	  1995).	   	   	  Reports	  suggested	   that	   these	  RBS	  traders	  made	  little	  or	  no	  attempt	  to	  cover	  their	  tracks,	  leaving	  ‘a	  trail	  of	  evidence	  in	  a	  trove	  of	  emails	  and	  audio	  recordings,	  detailing	  how	  they	  set	  about	  trying	  to	  manipulate	  LIBOR,	  even	   after	   they	   knew	   investigators	  were	   looking	   into	   the	   issue’	   (Feb	   9th,	   2013).	   	   This	  implied	  that	  senior	  managers	  also	  knew	  about	  LIBOR	  rigging	  by	  the	  bank	  but	  turned	  a	  blind-­‐‑eye.	  	  	  	  
The	  investigation.	  In	  2016	  investigations	  further	  implicated	  RBS	  in	  what	  	  became	  a	  global	  financial	  scandal	  that	  threatened	  trust	  in	  the	  world’s	  financial	  system	  (McBride	  et	  al.	  2015).	  	  However,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  no	  individual	  from	  RBS	  has	  been	  charged	  through	  criminal	  prosecutions,	  but	  the	  UK	  Serious	  Fraud	  Office	  has	  received	  criticism	  for	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  investigations	  into	  LIBOR	  rigging.	  	  
	  
Trust	   repair.	   In	  2013,	  RBS	   admitted	   to	   ‘rigging	   rates’	   and	   engaged	   in	   relational	   trust	  repair	   involving	   punishment	   and	   penance	   (Bachmann	   et	   al.	   2015).	   For	   example,	   they	  agreed	  to	  a	  $475m	  fine	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  US	  regulators	  and	  a	  further	  £87.5bn	  to	  be	  paid	  to	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the	  FSA	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  the	  bank	  escaped	  another	  fine	  of	  €115m	  only	  after	  alerting	   the	  European	  Commission’s	  competition	  regulator	   to	   two	  attempts	  by	  a	  Swiss	  bank	  cartel	  to	  manipulate	  Swiss	  franc	  lending	  rates	  between	  2008	  and	  2009.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  story	  continues	  Further	  financial	  problems	  occurred	  in	  May	  2015	  when	  RBS	  and	  four	  other	  banks	  pleaded	  guilty	  to	  criminal	  charges	  of	  manipulating	  foreign	  exchange	  markets	  and	  agreed	  to	  pay	  $5bn	  in	  fines	  to	  the	  US	  Justice	  Department	  and	  other	  regulators.	  	  RBS’s	  proportion	  of	  the	  fine	  was	  $395m	  to	  the	  Justice	  Department	  and	  $274m	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve.	  	  The	  bank	  was	  also	  put	  on	  probation	  for	  three	  years	  by	  the	  Justice	  Department.	  
	  
Additional	  evidence	  of	  RBS’s	  culpability	  in	  the	  GFC	  occurred	  	  in	  November	  2013.	  This	  time	  the	  American	  Securities	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC)	  announced	  that	  RBS	  was	  to	  pay	  $153m	  to	  settle	  charges	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  carry	  out	  due	  diligence	  and	  mis-­‐‑sold	  sub-­‐‑prime	  mortgages	  to	  investors	  in	  2007.	  	  This	  settlement	  over	  financial	  mismanagement	  was	  trumped	  in	  2017	  when	  the	  American	  Federal	  Housing	  Finance	  Agency	  announced	  that	  RBS	  was	  to	  pay	  a	  fine	  of	  $5.5bn	  to	  settle	  claims	  associated	  with	  the	  sale	  of	  toxic	  securities,	  prior	  to	  the	  GFC,	  to	  two	  of	  the	  largest	  US	  financial	  institutions	  –	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddie	  Mac.	  	  
Finally,	  RBS	  has	  recently	  been	  forced	  to	  apologise	  to	  its	  small	  business	  customers	  and	  pay	  compensation	  for	  bad	  service	  from	  one	  of	  its	  divisions,	  the	  Global	  Restructuring	  Group	  (GRG).	  	  This	  division	  was	  charged	  with	  having	  forced	  many	  small	  firms	  into	  unnecessary	  insolvency	  to	  boost	  its	  profitability.	  	  Although	  the	  UK	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  (FCA)	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only	   found	   evidence	   of	   isolated	   examples	   of	   poor	   practice,	   RBS	   proposed	   a	   £400m	  settlement	  to	  its	  former	  customers	  and	  closed	  down	  the	  GRG	  division.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  2018	  an	  official	  government	  report	  into	  the	  GRG	  division	  heavily	  criticised	  the	  FCA	  for	  failing	  to	  fully	  investigate	  the	  extent	  of	  GRG	  exploitation	  of	  its	  small	  business	  customers	  (This	  is	  Money,	  Feb	  11th,	  2018)	  
	  
Discussion	  Over	   the	   past	   years	   RBS	   has	   suffered	   a	   number	   of	   reputational	   scandals	   resulting	   in	  serious	  breaches	  of	  trust.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  repair	  trust	  the	  bank	  engaged	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  strategies,	  most	  of	  them	  previously	  codified	  and	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  (Dirks	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015).	  For	  example,	  RBS	  imposed	  structural	  constraints	  on	  future	  conduct,	  made	  processes	  more	  transparent,	  and	  introduced	  greater	  internal	  regulation,	  initiated	  policy	  changes,	  and	  established	  internal	  inquiries.	  	  Also,	  the	  bank	  used	  symbolic	  actions	  such	  as	  apologising	  during	  Parliamentary	  Select	  Committee	  hearings	  (Whittle	  and	  Mueller	  2012,	  130)	  and	  depriving	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  his	  knighthood,	  which	  are	  part	  of	  relational	  trust	  repair	  (Bachmann	  et	  al.	  2015).	  However,	  while	  engaging	  in	  trust	  repair	  efforts	  the	  bank	  also	  continues	  to	  transgress,	  further	  damaging	  trust.	  	  Fifty	  years	  ago	  Pondy	  (1967)	  discussed	  conflict	  in	  an	  organization	  as	  an	  aberration	  and	  a	  temporary	  disruption	  in	  an	  otherwise	  smooth	  flow	  of	  cooperative	  relationships.	  Twenty	  years	  later,	  Pondy	  (1989)	  came	  to	  reject	  this	  view	  and	  suggested	  that	  ‘far	  from	  being	  a	  ‘breakdown’	  in	  the	  system,	  conflict	  (…)	  is	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  what	  an	  organization	  is.’	  	  So,	  rather	   than	   treating	   conflict	   as	   an	   occasional	   outbreak,	   he	   treated	   cooperation	   and	  equilibrium	   as	   occasional	   outbreaks	   of	   peace	   against	   the	   background	   of	   relatively	  permanent	  and	  inherent	  conflict	  in	  firms.	  	  	  Using	  the	  evidence	  of	  repeated	  transgressions	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in	   the	  RBS	  case,	  one	  might	  pose	   the	  question:	  Are	   trust	  breaches	   the	   ‘new	  normal’	   for	  organizations	  like	  RBS?	  	  	  	  Earlier	  research	  (Ingersoll	  and	  Adams	  1992;	  Sayles	  and	  Smith	  2005;	   McCabe	   2007)	   suggests	   that	   organizational	   cultures	   and	   subcultures	   persist	  regardless	  of	  changes	  in	  senior	  leadership	  and	  the	  broader	  cultural	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  be	  identified	  and	  tackled	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  a	  series	  of	  long-­‐‑term	  mistakes.	   	   	  It	  would	  be	  an	  overstatement	   to	   say	   that	   RBS	   has	   a	   criminal	   culture;	   therefore,	   we	   use	   the	   term	  recidivism	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  repeating	  pattern	  of	  	  undesirable	  occurrences	  that	  seem	  to	   be	   deeply	   woven	   into	   the	   bank’s	   history	   and	   culture.	   	   	   An	   undercurrent	   of	   an	  organizational	  culture	  prone	  to	  breaching	  stakeholders’	  trust	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  RBS	  case,	  with	  excessive	  risk-­‐‑taking	  generated	  by	   the	  high	  pay	  rewards	  endemic	   in	   the	   financial	  services	  industry	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  (Acharya	  and	  Richardson	  2009).	  	  	  So	  how	  did	  the	  detective	  story	  as	  a	  metaphor	  (Czarniawska	  1999)	  help	  us	  understand	  breaches	  of	  trust?	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  case	  of	  RBS	  through	  this	  particular	  analytical	  lens	  we	  were	  able	  to	  propose	  a	  more	  nuanced	  interpretation	  of	  why	  trust	  in	  RBS	  proved	  to	  be	  so	  difficult	  to	  repair.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  could	  see	  the	  RBS	  case	  as	  resembling	  the	  narrative	  of	  a	  tragedy,	  a	  feature	  of	  more	  complex	  detective	  stories	  (Holt	  and	  Zundel	  2014).	  	  	  However,	  what	   trust	   scholars	   often	   miss	   when	   researching	   organizational	   trust	   breaches	   and	  transgressions	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  two	  inter-­‐‑linked	  stories,	  in	  which	  actors	  and	  their	  actions	  provide	  important	  inner	  contexts	  for	  each	  other	  and	  thereby	  mutually	  constitute	  each	  other.	  	  	  	  Our	  key	  contribution	  to	  the	  organizational	  trust	  repair	  literature	  is	  in	  using	  a	  detective	  narrative	  structure	  and	  identify	  one	  story	  about	  the	  ‘criminals’	  and	  the	  ‘crime’,	  i.e.	  key	  organizational	  actors	  and	  actions	  that	  led	  to	  trust	  breaches;	  and	  a	  second	  	  about	  the	  investigation,	  i.e.	  the	  ‘detectives’	  and	  their	  actions	  in	  trying	  to	  uncover	  what	  happened,	  who	  was	  guilty,	  why	  they	  were	  guilty	  and	  how	  did	  they	  become	  guilty.	  	  	  Thus	  we	  explored	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the	  interaction	  between	  the	  organization	  and	  people	  that	  breached	  trust	  and	  the	  agents	  who	   investigated	   the	   breaches,	   showing	   how	   the	   two	   stories	   were	   dynamically	  interlinked	   over	   time	   and	   providing	   important	   inner	   contexts	   for	   each	   others’	  sensemaking	  and	  actions.	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  our	  findings	  are	  in	  line	  with	  those	  analyses	  that	  point	   to	   the	   field-­‐‑level	   culture	   in	   the	   banking	   industry	   with	   its	   prevailing	   level	   of	  dishonesty	  (Cohn,	  Fehr	  and	  Marechal,	  2014).	  	  	  Thus	   in	   our	   case,	   RBS	   and	   its	   senior	   managers	   are	   the	   habitual	   offenders	   causing	  reputational	   scandals,	   which	   have	   resulted	   in	   exacerbated	   public	   disapproval	   but	   not	  necessarily	  disapproval	  among	  the	  banking	  profession	  and	  its	  field	  (G30	  Working	  Group,	  2015).	   	   	   The	   detectives	   were	   many,	   sometimes	   investigating	   jointly,	   at	   other	   times	  conducting	   their	   own	   investigations:	   internal	   regulators,	   the	   UK	   government,	   the	   UK	  regulator	   and	   other	   regulators,	   the	   UK	   Parliament	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   Treasury	   Select	  Committee,	   Bank	   of	   England,	   rating	   agencies,	   the	   financial	   and	   popular	   press,	   and	  academics.	   Examining	   the	   role	   of	   these	   investigators	   in	   solving	   ‘crimes’	   helps	   us	  understand	  why	  RBS	  has	   been	   relatively	   ineffective	   in	   recovering	   the	   trust	   of	   various	  stakeholders.	   The	   work	   of	   the	   investigators	   may	   not	   always	   have	   been	   effective	   in	  identifying	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  problems,	  and	  the	  bank,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  general	  public,	  may	  well	   have	   been	   lulled	   into	   accepting	   the	   handiest	   solutions	   offered.	   Furthermore,	  Boltanski	  (2014)	  noted	  that	  in	  detective	  fiction	  the	  unveiling	  comes	  after	  an	  inquiry,	  but	  at	   the	   same	   time	   inquiry	   interrupts	   the	   course	   of	   action	   and	  may	   even	  diffuse	   it.	   The	  investigations	  of	  RBS	  scandals	  did	  indeed	  interrupt	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  bank	  and	  perhaps	  even	  helped	   in	   the	   trust	  repair	  process,	  but	  overall	   they	   failed	   to	  stop	  RBS	   falling	   into	  further	  difficulties.	  For	  example,	  the	  bank	  claimed	  it	  could	  not	  ‘move	  on’	  until	  the	  internal	  PPI	   inquiry	   was	   finished.	   Arguably,	   these	   investigations,	   paradoxically,	   further	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undermined	  trust	  in	  RBS	  by	  scapegoating	  prominent	  individuals	  and	  revealing	  evidence	  of	  wrongdoing	  on	  a	  larger	  scale	  than	  originally	  anticipated	  (Bachman,	  Gillespie,	  and	  Priem	  2015).	  	  	  
Like good literature, the tragic narrative of this case is best understood as unfolding episodes 
(Holt and Zundel 2014).  In episode 1, discussed earlier, the old Financial Services Authority 
and the new Financial Conduct Authority found evidence of problems within their regulatory 
framework and supervisory approach.  However, actions resulting from the identification of 
these deficiencies were slow, and did not prevent the collapse and subsequent bailout. 
Moreover, the FSA’s own admission of failure further damaged the public’s trust in the 
financial sector. In episode 2, the media exposure of Goodwin’s pension  and the government’s 
removal of his knighthood had symbolic value for the taxpayer, but failed to get to the root of 
the problem of excessive payments in the banking sector. In episode 3,  the transgressions 
surrounding the PPI scandal were not investigated properly, despite the Financial Ombudsman 
Service in 2010 upholding the majority of complaints concerning RBS PPI sales, which resulted 
in massive compensation payouts. Regardless of these remedial measures, RBS continued to 
be found guilty of mis-selling PPIs to customers.  In episode 4, investigations surrounding 
LIBOR rates are ongoing and the investigators continue to find evidence of RBS’s wrongdoing. 
The slow progress of  investigations is another area of concern for which the Serious Fraud 
Office has received its fair share of criticism. Consequently, until guilt is attributed and 
punishment served, trust will be difficult to repair and organizational actors will fail to learn. 	  So	  why	  have	  the	  detectives	  not	  been	  effective	  in	  finding	  out	  what	  went	  wrong	  and	  why?	  	  We	   suggest	   some	   potential	   explanations.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   the	   various	   bodies	   had	  insufficient	  power	  to	  dig	  deep	  enough	  and	  enforce	  changes	  in	  the	  banks’	  practices	  that	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would	   help	   it	   recover	   trust.	   	   This	   was	   certainly	   the	   case	   with	   the	   Treasury	   Select	  Committee,	  which	  was	  limited	  to	  asking	  questions	  without	  being	  able	  to	  enforce	  changes.	  The	   second	   is	   that	   the	   UK	   government,	   FSA,	   Bank	   of	   England	   and,	   indeed,	   financial	  journalists	  were	  too	  close	  to	  the	  City	  of	  London	  banking	  community	  to	  have	  the	  necessary	  perspective	   and,	   arguably,	   motivation	   to	   dig	   deep	   enough.	   There	   are	   two	   possible	  explanations	  for	  this	   lack	  of	  perspective.	   	  Firstly,	  an	  often-­‐‑made	  criticism	  of	  regulatory	  bodies	   is	   that	   they	   are	   staffed	   by	   individuals	   who	   either	   have	   values	   and	   identities	  inextricably	   bound	   up	   with	   the	   logics	   of	   an	   industry	   (Besharov,	   2014)	   or	   are	   not	  sufficiently	   distanced	   to	   give	   unbiased	   or	   independent	   judgements.	   Secondly,	   the	  investigators	   may	   have	   feared	   that	   by	   uncovering	   evidence	   of	   wrongdoing	   in	   one	  situation,	   they	   could	   bring	   the	  whole	   system	   into	   disrepute,	   including	   the	   role	   of	   the	  ‘detectives’.	   	   This	   relates	   to	   a	   plot	   often	   used	   in	   detective	   novels,	  where	   the	   principle	  detective	   is	   prevented	   from	   digging	   too	   deep	   by	   colleagues	   (the	   novels	   by	   Michael	  Connelly	  or	  Harry	  Bosch)	  or	  politicians	  (as	  in	  ‘the	  Wire’).	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  internal	  and	   external	   detectives	   in	   the	   RBS	   case	   may	   have	   managed	   an	   impression	   of	   doing	  detective	   work,	   but	   failed	   to	   solve	   the	   repeated	   crimes,	   which,	   according	   to	   some	  commentators,	  necessitated	  a	  root	  and	  branch	  change	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  field	  of	  banking	  in	   general	   and	  RBS	   in	   particular.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	  UK	  government	   commission	   established	   to	   examine	   the	   culture	  of	   banking	   in	   the	  UK	  was	  disbanded	  before	  it	  could	  produce	  a	  report	  (Dunkley	  2015).	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  third	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  investigators	  failed	  relates	  to	  those	  stories	  that	  feature	  competing	  teams	  of	  detectives	  focusing	  on	  separate	  aspects	  of	  a	  crime	  (e.g.	  the	  archetypical	  serial	  killer	  novel)	  but	  sometimes	  working	  against	  each	  other.	  	  	  For	  example,	  external	   investigators,	   such	  as	   the	  FSA,	   the	  UK	  Parliament	   and	   the	  popular	  press,	   had	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different	  motives	  and	  frames	  of	  reference	  from	  internal	   investigators	  and	  the	   financial	  press	  concerning	  	  inquiries	  into	  the	  Bank’s	  bonus	  payments	  system.	  	  It	  was	  also	  evident	  that	   the	   role	   of	   the	   popular	   press	   in	   scapegoating	   Goodwin	   hindered	   more	   serious	  investigation	  into	  RBS’s	  culture	  through	  attributing	  failure	  to	  individuals	  rather	  than	  the	  system	  that	  produced	  such	  behaviours.	  	  Our	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  activity	  of	  investigation	  affected	  the	  actions	  of	  RBS,	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  RBS	  often	  de-­‐‑railed	  the	  detectives’	  work.	  By	  engaging	  in	  repair	  actions,	  such	  as	  compensations,	  deals,	  apologies,	  and	  ritual	   sackings,	   the	  bank	   ‘lulled’	   the	   investigators	  into	  believing	  that	  the	  problems	  had	  been	  solved.	  The	  investigators,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  created	  the	  impression	  of	  doing	  detective	  work	  without	  getting	  at	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  problems.	  This	  ineffective	  detective	  work	  did	  not	  cause	  recurring	  transgressions,	  but	  may	  have	  hindered	  more	  in-­‐‑depth	  analysis	  of	  them.	  	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  trust	  studies	  that	  focused	  on	  a	  single	  scandal	  and	  subsequent	  repair	  actions,	  we	  considered	  a	  number	  of	  trust	  breaches	  committed	  by	  RBS.	  In	  each	  event	  we	  analysed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  trust	  breach,	  the	  accepted	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  the	  trust	  repair	  strategies	  implemented.	  This	  approach,	  based	  on	  ‘zooming	  out’,	  allowed	  us	  to	  identify	   a	   pattern	   of	   transgressions	   characterised	   by	   an	   inadequate	   diagnosis	   of	  what	  went	  wrong	  in	  the	  bank.	  	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  trust	  breaches	  in	  RBS	  were	  independent	  of	  each	  other,	  and	  each	  	  should	  be	  analysed	  as	  a	  separate	  instance	  of	  trust	  violation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  events	  discussed	  might	  be	  the	  outcomes	  of	   the	  same	  problem	  –	   in	   the	  case	  of	  RBS,	   the	  use	  of	  financial	   incentives	  to	  address	  all	  problems	  of	  motivation	  and	  control.	  Either	  way,	   it	   is	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difficult	  not	  to	  notice	  that	  RBS	  engaged	  in	  recidivist	  behaviour	  –	  it	  continued	  to	  breach	  trust	   despite	   various	   investigations	   and	   external	   and	   internal	   interventions	   aimed	   at	  reforming	  it.	  	  	  Our	   study	   has	   taken	   an	   alternative	   perspective	   on	   trust	   breaches	   and	   trust	   repair	   by	  capturing	   the	   cyclical	   nature	   of	   repeated	   transgression.	   We	   analysed	   these	   from	   a	  historical	  perspective,	  which	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  re-­‐‑integration	  is	  always	  problematic,	  as	  new	  acts	  of	  transgression	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  the	  norm.	  Returning	  to	  our	  guiding	  analogy	  of	   failed	   detective	   work	   –	   the	   reader	   of	   the	   story	   has	   every	   right	   to	   expect	   further	  transgressions,	  just	  like	  in	  an	  engaging	  detective	  series.	  	  	  
Managerial	  implications	  Our	  analysis	  of	   the	  RBS	  case	  also	  points	   to	   certain	  weaknesses	   in	   current	   trust	   repair	  scholarship	   and	   managerial	   practice.	   Many	   scholars	   focus	   on	   one	   organizational	  transgression	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  and	  apply	  stage	  models	  of	  trust	  repair	  to	  understand	  the	  process	  of	  organizational	  recovery	  (which	  is	  a	  weak	  process	  theory	  –	  see	  Chia	  and	  Langley	   2004)	   or	   adopt	   a	   variance	   theory	   perspective	   (which	   is	   short	   on	   ‘how’	   type	  explanations).	  However,	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  ‘trust	  repair’	  implies	  a	  mechanical	  metaphor,	  which	  often	  implies	  little	  more	  than	  mechanical	  solutions.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  both	  the	  variance	   theory	   and	   the	   stage	   models	   and	   thinking	   are	   valid	   and	   of	   practical	   use	   to	  organizations	  that	  attempt	  to	  rebuild	  trust.	  What	  is	  missing	  in	  these	  models,	  however,	  is	  an	   appreciation	   of	   the	   ‘wicked	   problems’	   (Rittel	   and	   Weber	   1973)	   inherent	   in	  organizations	   and	   the	   complicated	   and	   unfolding	   nature	   of	   repeated	   transgressions,	  which,	   we	   argue,	   is	   addressed	   by	   approaching	   trust	   repair	   from	   a	   detective	   novel	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perspective,	   involving	   multiple	   stories	   that	   provide	   a	   more	   nuanced	   and	   complete	  reading.	  	  An	  organization	  may	  be	  admitting	  the	  destructive	  impact	  of	  the	  event	  on	  trust,	  and	  beginning	  to	  show	  willingness	  to	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  the	  violation	  (Lewicki	  and	  Bunker	  1996),	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  new	  transgression	  may	  happen,	  further	  damaging	  trust	  and	  derailing	  trust	  repair	  efforts.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  stages	  of	  trust	  repair	  overlap	  with	  transgressions.	  Therefore,	  what	  is	  needed	  in	  organizations	  is	  longitudinal	  analysis	  that	  is	  not	  constrained	  to	  one	  transgression	  and	  takes	  into	  account	  organizational	  history,	  including	   the	   history	   of	   earlier	   wrongdoings,	   and	   different	   perspectives	   on	   what	   this	  history	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  rounded	  analysis	  and	  practical	  resolutions	  to	  these	  wicked	  problems.	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